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Abstract: 
Since its establishment as a state in 1948 Israel has based its relations with Arab 
countries and the Palestinians on the principles of denial of Palestinian national 
rights, the threat of military force and collaboration with corrupt, undemocratic Arab 
regimes. 
The Arab revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are having 
an impact on the relationships between Israel and the Palestinians on one hand and 
Israel and neighbouring Arab countries on the other. 
The social and political changes that these revolutions have provoked have 
questioned Israel’s military doctrine. The have also inspired Palestinians and Israelis 
to take nonviolent action in their pursuit of peace and justice. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the “Arab Spring” on the Palestinian Israeli conflict and how 
it has changed the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian authority. The terms Arab 
"Revolutions" (Thawra in Arabic), “Awakening” (Nahda) or Intifada (Uprising) are the terms 
mostly used by Arab sources, with the “Arab Spring” mainly used in the West.1 For this paper 
I use the term Arab Revolutions. Rabab El-Mahdi, in “Orientalizing the Egyptian Uprising”, 
criticises the way the Egyptian revolution has been depicted in the local and international 
media as if it is alien to the Arab culture.2 This paper will highlight the different perceptions of 
the Arab revolutions amongst Palestinians and Israelis and will explore the influence it had on 
their own societies and political leadership. It will also reflect on the changes and 
reorientation of political powers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a whole. 
 
The outbreak of the Arab revolutions that swept the MENA countries from December 2010 
came as a surprise to many observers, including media reporters and researchers. It caught 
political leaders, diplomats and foreign relations experts on Middle East affairs unaware, and 
unprepared for the scale and widespread nature of the nonviolent mass demonstrations.3 
The international news media presented the death of the young Tunisian vegetable vendor 
Mohammed Bo Azizi as the spark that triggered the Arab revolutions. He set himself on fire 
on 17 December 2010 in protest against the confiscation of his goods and his humiliation. 
According to this argument, the case of Bo Azizi indicates that the root causes of the Arab 
revolutions are social, political and economic inequality and oppression.  In Egypt the number 
of people living on less than two dollars a day grew from 39 percent to percent of the 
population during the last decade of Mubarak regime.4 
 
By contrast, civil society organisations and opposition groups in Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt 
have argued that the process of the Arab revolutions started a few years ago and was the 
culmination of long and hard work by civil society organisations, trade unions, professional 
bodies and political groups in promoting advocacy and raising awareness. Protesters 
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1. For discussion on this issue see Rami Khouri, Drop the Orientalist term “Arab Spring” http://
english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/19/162970.htmlfor Accessed 3 September 2012. See also  
2. Rabab El-Mahdi., Orientalizing the Egyptian Uprising, Jadalyiyya, April 2011. http://
www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1214/orientalising-the-egyptian-uprising. (Accessed 13 January 
2013)  
3. Jeremy Salt, Containing the “Arab Spring”, Journal for and about Social Change movements, volume 
4, (1): 54-66, May 2012. 
4. Rashid, Khalidi, Preliminary Historical Observations on the Revolutions of 2011,  , in Eds, Bassam Had-
dad, Rosie Bsheer and Ziad Abu Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprising, End of an Old Order, Pluto 
Press, London, 2012. 
overcame their fear and the tyranny of the regime to hold mass demonstrations in Tunisia in 
December 2010 and Egypt in January 2011, calling for the removal of Presidents Bin Ali and 
Mubarak and demanding political and social freedom.  The slogan in Arabic “"Al-Shaa’b Yored 
Isqat al-Nizam", meaning the "the people demand the fall of the regime", or “Irhal” (Go, 
Leave) united protesters across the MENA region and became an iconic feature of the Arab 
revolutions.5 
 
In the last few decades, Arab leaders in the MENA countries have faced several attempted 
coups from within the military establishment or by radical Islamist groups to overthrow them 
by force. All of these attempts were suppressed and resulted in heavy restrictions on political 
freedoms and long term imprisonment for those involved. The Arab revolutions however 
were characterised by mass protest for civil and political rights, a contradiction of the top 
down approach that promotes change through violent means and with limited involvement 
of citizens. One argument is that the active nonviolent civil approach adopted by the 
revolution is the polar opposite to a military coup and as such has served to undermine the 
use of violence as a strategy for change.6 Bishara warns against the threat of violence and 
notes that “The challenge for the Arabs is to define their conflict through peaceful protest, 
and not be dragged into bloody conflicts that tend to change people for worse… [change 
must be] ...defined by the dream of a peaceful and prosperous future”.7 
 
In both Egypt and Tunisia national armies were reluctant to use force to maintain presidential 
power. This prevented escalation of violence against demonstrators, although in Egypt there 
were some violent clashes with the army, which caused the death of many civilians.8 However 
both were in contrast to the situations in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, where the military 
played a significant role in the repression of the opposition to the regime. The police, army 
and other special security forces in these countries conducted a violent attack against 
civilians, which caused hundreds of injuries and deaths.  However, whilst the army in Egypt 
and Tunisia have retained the trust of the people, the police and special security forces are in 
a different position.  Much of the public’s anger in the post-revolution period has been 
directed against them and the institutions they represent, not least because they deployed 
violence and control tactics aimed at preventing the spread of the demonstrations and 
containing the revolution.9 
 
The Arab revolution in Egypt and Tunisia had two phases. The first phase united all political, 
social and religious forces under one slogan “down with the regime" and "leave, we don’t 
want you". Secular forces, religious groups, trade unions, the working and middle classes, the 
young and old, men and women took to the streets in cities and villages to call for the 
downfall of the regime and for political freedom. Khouri described it as “the birth of the Arab 
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5. Marc Lynch, “The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring: Do the Middle East’s Revolutions Have a Uniting 
Ideology” Foreign Policy, December 2011. 
6. Michael Theodoulu, The National newspaper,  27July 2011, and Amro Ali, “Brothers in the Hood: 
Egypt’s  Soft Powers and the Arab World.  http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8899/brothers-in-
the-hood_egypt’s-soft-powers-and-the-a (Accessed 14 January 2013) 
7. Marwan Bishara, A Rude Arab Awakening, Al-Jazeera, 1 August 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2011/08/201181131751785145.html (Accessed 13 January 2013)  
8. See Jeremy Salt Ibid 
9. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/qa-state-human-rights-middle-east-and-north-africa-2012-01-10 
(Accessed 15 January 2012).  
citizen” and “true Arab sovereignty”.10 Dabashi argued that the Arab revolutions will define a 
new era in the Middle East and mark the end of Postcolonialism.11 
 
The second phase focused on the demands to transfer power from military rule to civil 
elected government.  The challenge facing the revolutions was to transform the structures 
and the institutions that maintained regimes in power, and to seek the establishment of 
transparent and accountable political and judicial structures that would allow citizens to 
participate in the decision making and shaping of their society. Both countries held 
parliamentary elections in 2011/12. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood, under the name of the 
Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafist Party (Al-Aslah) won a majority of the votes for 
the parliament. Similarly in Tunisia Al-Nahada (Muslim Brothers) also won a majority. 
 
During this period of transition it will be critical to establish the foundation for free political 
participation and freedom of organisation, respect of human and civil rights and means to 
address the social and economic root causes of deprivation and marginalisation that impact 
on the majority in society. This is a daunting project facing the new elected governments, 
which must seek social and political reform and economic growth across the board, and to 
make provision for equal opportunities in work and education for many marginalised citizens.  
 
Features of the Arab Israeli Conflict 
 
Since its foundation, the Zionist movement has perceived the Arab indigenous population of 
Palestine as aliens and primitive people, proposing that Jews from Europe would modernise 
the country and "turn the desert to bloom". By dint of their number, the Palestinian 
population were (and are) perceived as a threat to the integrity of Israel as a Jewish state – 
unique in the world. Ben Gurion, leader of the Zionist Movement and the first Prime Minister 
of Israel, declared as early as 1920 that the ”Arabs of Palestine did not constitute a separate 
national entity but were part of the Arab nation”12, arguing that ideally it would be better to 
have Palestine empty of its Arab Palestinian inhabitants to establish the Jewish homeland. 
Later Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister from 1969-74, took the position of publicly denying 
the existence of the Palestinian people.13 There has long been a clash between the fulfilment 
of the Jewish aspiration for a homeland in Palestine and the rights of the Palestinians over 
their land and sovereignty. Over time more than one million Palestinians have become 
refugees in neighbouring Arab countries and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Many of these 
either fled or were displaced from lands in Israel during the 1948 and 1967 wars.14 
 
The use of military force by Israel towards Arab countries and Palestine is one of the main 
features of their fractious relationship(s).  Israel has military superiority in the MENA region 
and ranks within the top ten countries in the world for its military capability.  It has had 
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10. Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs, Connecting the Arab Spring to Palestine, December 
2011, Vol, 30, issue 9,pp 63-63. 
11. Hamid, Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism, Zed books, London2012.  
12. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, London, Penguin Books, 2000, p17. 
13. Ibid 
14. For further discussion about the perception of the Zionist Movement of the Palestinians see Edward 
Said, The Question of Palestine, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980. Mossad, J “The post-
colonial” colony: time space and bodies in Palestine/Israel” in Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Sesha-
dri-Crooks, eds. The Preoccupation of Post colonial Studies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Journal of  Conflict  
Transformation & Security 
nuclear capacity since the late 1960s and remains the only nuclear armed country in the 
Middle East. It is not a signatory to the nuclear proliferation treaty and does not openly 
declare the extent of its nuclear capability. This is in contrast to neighbouring Arab countries, 
many of whom have been ranked much below Israel in terms of military capability.  The 
asymmetry of power between the parties has enabled the Israelis to maintain a controlling 
and dominant position in its relationships with Arab neighbours.15 
 
Jabotinsky, founder of Revisionist Zionism and father of the Israeli right, argued that it is only 
through the establishment of military force impervious to Arab pressure that the Jewish 
homeland can be secured.  Ben Gurion voiced the same conclusion after the outbreak of the 
Arab Revolt in 1936, advocating for a gradualist strategy combined with the use of military 
power in order to force Arab neighbours and Palestinians to acquiesce to the establishment 
of Jewish state in the “Land of Israel”. To implement such a strategy Israel has had to base its 
approach on the use of force, in the knowledge that Palestinians would not give up their 
national rights through free choice. Only through suppression could Israel impose its own will 
and agenda on the Palestinians and Arabs, compelling them to negotiate from a weak 
position.16 
 
By examining the history and trajectory of the Israeli Arab conflict since 1948 we can see the 
success of this policy and the impact that Israel’s military supremacy has had on conflict 
dynamics. Israel first signed the Camp David peace agreement with President Sadat of Egypt 
in 1979. It also signed the Oslo agreement with the PLO in 1993, and immediately afterwards 
signed a peace agreement with Jordan. In all of these, Israel was the powerful party. The 
military imbalance of power in favour of Israel has been translated to political coercion in the 
form of imposing political conditions for "peace agreement".  
 
Meanwhile Israel has imposed military rule on the Palestinians who remained within the 
borders of the newly created state of Israel in 1948.  It has imposed complex dual legal 
systems and policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967, with one system for the 
Jewish settlers and another for the Palestinians. The settlers enjoy civil and political rights as 
the state’s Jewish citizens, while the Palestinians have been denied their civil and human 
rights. Israel has total military control over the Palestinian territories, including entry and exit, 
and has imposed a movement restriction on the Palestinians within the territories through 
checkpoints and travel restrictions. Israel also has control over resources such as water, land, 
planning and building permissions. “A prolonged system and structure of discrimination has 
led to severe economic deprivation, exhaustion, despair and denial of the national rights of 
the Palestinians”.17 The overall control of Israel on the life of the Palestinians reflects the 
imbalance of power between the parties and has become a defining feature of the Arab 
Israeli conflict.  
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15. Avi Shlim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Penguin books, 2000 
16. Avi Shlaim, Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Reflections. Verso, 2009, part 1. See also Ibid, 
pp11-22. 
17. Marwan Darweish, "Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", Ve-
ronique Dudouet and B. Schmelzle (eds) Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: The Challenge for 
Just Peace, Germany: Berghof Handbook Dialogue Serious 9, 2010, p88. 
While Israel is often perceived in terms which recognise its uniquely Jewish character and 
military supremacy, Arab countries in the MENA region also have their own defining features. 
They have long been characterised by the prolonged and intense control that Western 
colonial powers have exerted over the region. This extended from Morocco to Egypt and the 
Arab peninsula and through Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon in the north. In the 
post-colonial period many Arab leaders stayed in power for decades after the struggle for 
national liberation in the 1940s and 50s. Anderson argues that is a  situation unique to the 
region, stating that  “The collective longevity of the rulers had no parallel anywhere else in 
the world: Gaddafi in power for 41 years, Assad father and son 40, Saleh 32, Mubarak 29, Ben 
Ali 23”.18  Both Mubarak and Saleh were preparing the ground for their sons to take power, 
had they been able to appoint a successor. Dynastic rule has been common, spanning the 
Saudi Royal family and other Sheiks and Sultans in the Gulf States, the Hashemite Royal 
family in Jordan and the Alaouite monarchy in Morocco. These families passed power down 
through generations of royal autocratic rule, typically with very little respect for human or 
political rights. They have also been considered vital allies of the US and Europe.19 
 
  Most of Israel’s and the USA’s long-term allies in the Middle East have been corrupt and 
undemocratic regimes, including those in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. The people 
of these Arab countries have experienced political and economic corruption, grinding poverty 
and frequent violations of their human rights. Although MENA countries have about two 
thirds of the world’s known reserves of oil and natural gas, this wealth has not translated into 
fulfilling the political and economic aspirations of the region’s people.20 The standard of living 
is still poor and most of the wealth of these countries is in the hands of a small exceptionally 
rich minority drawn from the political group in power. This failure to provide benefits to the 
wider population has caused political tension, frustration and alienation from the political 
leadership and state. It has encouraged corruption and nepotism and created cynicism 
amongst the ordinary people.21 This economic impoverishment of the majority of the 
population has been exploited by radical secular and Islamic groups in the region, as they 
provide fertile ground for recruitment to political and military opposition aimed at the 
overthrow of the regimes.22 
 
While these features in the Israeli Arab conflict are longstanding and likely to endure, they 
are also subject to changing political winds. This is particularly the case in the current period 
of political flux following the Arab revolutions, which are without precedent in the region. 
Traditionally the USA, Israel and Egypt have maintained a strategic military and political 
alliance since the signing of the Camp David agreement. By entering into the agreement 
Egypt secured its place as an ally of the USA and leader of the “moderate Arab camp”. It was 
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18. Perry Anderson, “On the concatenation in the Arab world” New Left Review, no. 68, March-April 
2011, p8. 
19. Crisis Group International, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, Middle East Report N°45 – 19 Septem-
ber 2005. Also see http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/
Iran%20Gulf/Saudi%20Arabia/The%20Shiite%20Question%20in%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf.  Accessed 
25 September 20111. Accessed 2 May 2012.  
20. Heather Deegan, Third Worlds: The Politics of the middle East and Africa, Routledge, 1996, pp154-56 
21. See the World Bank Gross National Income Per Capita for 2010. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf  
22. Heather Deegan, Third Worlds: The Politics of the Middle East and Africa, Routledge, London, 1996, 
pp154-156. For more details see the web site and reports of Transparency International. 
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considered an important force in endorsing American foreign policy in the MENA region. 
Egypt also exercised leverage on the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) not to abandon the 
negotiations with Israel despite the continuation of Israeli occupation and failure of the Oslo 
peace process. Syria, by contrast, has led the radical and anti-American camp, an ally of Iran 
and Hezbollah and a base for Hamas and other Palestinian political groups opposed to the 
peace agreement with Israel.23 
 
Reflections on the impact of the Arab revolution on Palestinians 
 
The Arab revolutions have enabled ordinary citizens in the Middle East to break the barrier of 
fear in opposing undemocratic regimes and in calling for collective dignity and political and 
social change. Palestinians have not been immune to this wind of change, which provides 
opportunities and possible new directions for the Palestinian independence struggle. 
 
These areas of change and opportunity have opened up against a backdrop of deepening 
political divisions within the Palestinian political leadership and growing impoverishment 
throughout the territories. Since the Hamas victory in the 2006 election, tensions with rival 
party Fatah have escalated, and with Hamas’ military takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 the 
conflict between the two parties intensified further still. In reality the Palestinians have two 
authorities, one in the West Bank led by Fatah and the other in Gaza Strip led by Hamas. 
Hamas controls the Gaza Strip and Fatah the West Bank, with the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) centre of power in Ramallah. This political division within the Palestinian 
political leadership has coincided with a deepening of Palestinian impoverishment in the 
occupied territories, with Hamas facing international boycott and the PNA facing increased 
pressure from donors to introduce neo-liberal economic reforms and good governance.24  
 
The Arab revolutions provided motivation and justification for Palestinian youth in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip to take to the street to demand an end to the split between Hamas and 
Fatah and call for the formation of a new unity government.  The 15 March Youth Movement 
and the West Bank Popular Committees have all called for dialogue and unity between the 
opposing parties. Both parties have been criticised for representing their own parochial 
interests rather than the popular aspirations of the Palestinians. A survey conducted by the 
Arab World Centre for Research and Development (AWRAD) amongst Palestinian youth 
indicates that 58 percent of young people hold Hamas and Fatah equally to blame for the 
division in Palestinian society.25 
 
The youth adapted the slogans of the Arab revolutions; keeping the rhythm "Alshab Yored 
isqat al-Nizam” in English "the people demand the fall of the regime” to "Alshab Yored inhaa 
al inqisam" in English "the people demand an end to the split". The Palestinian pubic is aware 
that to face Israel they have to unite and implement a clear strategy and vision to end the 
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23. Noam Chomsky, Hopes and Prospects, London, Penguin Books, 2010. For more details see chapter 
ten, pp251-258.  
24. Mandy Turner, ‘The Power of “Shock and Awe”: The Palestinian Authority and the Road to Reform’, 
international Peacekeeping, Vol.16, no.4 
25. For more details see http://www.awrad.org/etemplate.php?id=275&x=4. See also the survey Novem-
ber 2011 amongst 1200 adult Palestinians in the occupied territories 
occupation and establish a sovereign Palestinian state. The leadership of Hamas and Fatah 
have become more sensitive to public opinion and pressure for unity, yet demonstrators still 
face harassment and violence by the Palestinian security forces in both the West Bank and 
Gaza.  On 16 March 2011, the day after a major demonstration from whence the 15 March 
Youth Movement claims its name, President Abbas announced his willingness to travel to 
Gaza to meet Hamas leaders to start reconciliation talks and the formation of a unity 
government.26 
 
In seeking to end the split between Fatah and Hamas and reconcile the Palestinian political 
leadership, President Abbas is in effect responding to popular opinion in Palestine. This is 
confirmed by a survey conducted by AWRAD in February 2012. Amongst 1200 youth in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip who were interviewed about their attitudes to the Arab 
Awakening, 43 per cent agreed that the events in other Arab countries are positively affecting 
the Palestinian situation. Another survey conducted by the same institution found that 50 per 
cent of the respondents agreed that the Egyptian revolution has had an impact on the 
Palestinian situation politically, and will ease living conditions.27 
 
The changes in Egypt have had a particularly profound effect in Palestine, not least because 
of the significant role that Egypt plays in Palestine’s internal politics and external affairs. Since 
2007 Egypt has played a leading role in mediating between Hamas and Fatah, though all the 
attempts have failed. This is partly because any agreement between Hamas and Fatah has 
been dependent on Israeli government and US approval, and both countries have pressured 
Egypt not to support an agreement that might strengthen Hamas and increase the influence 
of its allies.28 Egypt under Mubarak was a central pillar for both Israel and the USA to 
maintain the status quo in the Middle East. Under Mubarak, Egypt also aided Israel to 
reinforce a tight economic and diplomatic siege on the Hamas administration in the Gaza 
Strip and to hermetically seal off the Rafah crossing. By contrast Al Arabi, the first Egyptian 
Foreign Minister to be appointed after the revolution, explained his intentions to strengthen 
relations with the Palestinians and invest in efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah.29 There 
have been improvements in the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, evidenced by the visit of the Egyptian prime minister to Gaza and communications 
with Hamas during the war in Gaza in November 2012. New arrangements to partially open 
the Rafah crossing at the Egyptian border have been made, breaking the international 
blockade. However, security cooperation between Israel and Cairo remains strong. In 
particular, the joint effort to “clean-up” the Sinai and expunge militants is at one of highest 
levels for years.30 
 
The Mubarak regime supported Fatah in its power struggle with Hamas, both because of the 
historical roots that Hamas shared with the (then outlawed) Muslim Brotherhood and 
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26. Personal interview conducted by the author with Civil Society activist, 17 July 2012, Gaza Strip. 
27.   See www.awrad.org. 
28. Patrick Seale, If Assad Falls, We Will See All the Region’s Alliances Unravel, The Guardian. 12 April, 
p28. 
29. Doaa El-Bey, “New Face New Ideas”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23-29 June 2011, p.1. 
30. Amos Harel, Israel Egypt Security Cooperation at one of Highest Level since Peace Deal, Say Officials 
on both Sides. Haaretz 9 August 2012.  http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/east-side-story/israel-egypt-
security-cooperation-at-one-of-highest-levels-since-peace-deal-say-officials-on-both-sides-1.457085 
(Accessed 23 January 2013). 
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because of the position that Hamas occupied as a hostile opponent to Israel and the USA at 
national and regional level.  Erakat argues that “The fortitude of the Mubarak-Abbas alliance 
is also the result of profound and vested investment in maintaining US hegemony in the 
Middle East. The ouster of Mubarak would tip this balance and have broad ramifications”.31 
The political changes that have resulted from the Arab revolutions have indeed had broad 
ramifications, not least by presenting new opportunities to reopen dialogue between 
Palestinian’s conflicting parties. The removal of Mubarak, an ally of Fatah, and an 
acknowledged disenchantment of Fatah with the US have contributed to a reorientation of 
perspectives amongst the factions.   
 
The fall of Mubarak regime, the instability in Syria and the election of Morsi as President of 
Egypt, had created a new coalition between the Muslim Brothers in Gaza Strip and Egypt.  
The support to Hamas reached its highest level in November 2012, when a number of 
international and Arab leaders, including the Egyptian prime minister, visited Gaza. This 
change gave new legitimacy to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere in the Middle East, 
which was short-lived after the President was deposed by the military in July 2013.  Despite 
the new political reality it remains a challenge for the world to find a way to deal with 
political Islam empowered by political process.32 
 
The geographical proximity and the historical ties with Egypt further motivated Hamas to sign 
the Cairo agreement with Fatah on 4 May 2011. According to the agreement, a unity 
government would be formed mostly from technocrats and independent personalities in 
preparation for an election within a year. This would contest the Presidency, the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC, Palestinian Parliament), and the Palestinian National Council (PNC), a 
body that represents all the Palestinian political groupings. The control of the security forces 
was to be delayed until after the election, however new mechanisms were put in place to 
initiate reconciliation at grassroots level. The implementation of the agreement has stalled, 
initially because of Abbas’s insistence on retaining Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister, whom 
Hamas regards as too subservient to Israel and the West.33 Hamas has argued that Fayyad is 
hostile to their party and is responsible for the arrest of thousands of their supporters, with 
the encouragement of Tel Aviv.  However given resignation of Fayyad from his post in 2013 
and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, it can now be argued that better conditions for 
reconciliation might emerge and drive this process forward. 
 
Abbas has faced immense pressure from Israel and the USA to suspend talks with Hamas and 
to postpone efforts towards reconciliation. Israel threatened that it would withdraw facilities 
from the PNA leadership and withhold taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinians.  
This source of revenue is critical for the functioning of the PNA. The Obama administration 
has also exerted direct pressure on Abbas to keep Fayyad as Prime Minister or otherwise face 
political and financial sanctions. In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 
 
 
  
162 
Journal of  Conflict  
Transformation & Security 
Th
e 
P
al
e
sti
n
ia
n
 Is
ra
el
i C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
 in
 t
h
e 
sh
ad
o
w
 o
f 
th
e 
A
ra
b
 R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
s 
31. Noura Erakat and Sherene Seiklay, Thahrir’s Other Sky, in Eds, Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer and Ziad 
Abu Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprising, End of an Old Order, Pluto Press, London, 2012. 
32. Crisis Group International, Palestinian Reconciliation: Plus Ca Change, Middle East Report no.10, July 
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a powerful Israeli lobby group, President Obama made clear that “the recent agreement 
between Fatah and Hamas poses an enormous obstacle to peace”.34 
 
As well as increasing the public and political pressures on both sides of the debate on the rift 
between Hamas and Fatah, the Arab revolutions have highlighted the significance of 
nonviolent strategies in the struggle against Israeli oppression. Palestinians have a long 
tradition of using nonviolent action as a political strategy and means of resistance, being 
amongst the first to launch an organised popular uprising in 1936 to end British colonialism 
and in calling for an end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the first 
Intifada in 1987. The success of nonviolent popular resistance as a means for change in the 
wider Middle Eastern context has encouraged debate amongst the Palestinian leadership and 
public about its effectiveness as a strategy to achieve national and civil rights. Member of the 
PLC have commented that “We believe that nonviolent resistance is more participatory, it 
works locally and internationally. It broadens participation – armed struggle depends on 
small secret groups. Israeli power is more limited facing this kind of resistance; they cannot 
use their full power and justify its violence and force.  Also what happened in Arab countries 
encouraged this approach. Pursuing this model will be more acceptable to the internationals 
and undermine Israeli propaganda about Palestinians as terrorists wanting to kill all 
Israelis.”35 
 
In 1948 thousands of Palestinians (700,000 according to the UN) were forced out of their 
homes to become refugees in the neighbouring Arab countries and the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.36 The recent nonviolent action may have provided fresh hope that their demands for 
participation in the Palestinian debate and the right to return could ultimately be successful. 
A group of Palestinians created a Facebook page in March 2011 calling for peaceful 
nonviolent protest in Arab countries and internationally against the occupation and 
demanding the right of return for Palestinian refugees in accordance with UN resolutions. In a 
few weeks hundreds of thousands of people were organised through social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.37 
 
On 15 May 2011 thousands of Palestinian refugees from Syria and Lebanon crossed the 
heavily protected border with Israel in the occupied Golan Heights. This was to 
commemorate Nakba day (Catastrophe day), the day on which thousands of Palestinians 
were forced to leave their homes in 1948 and become refugees in the West Bank, Gaza and 
the neighbouring Arab countries. This mass nonviolent action by Palestinians refuges 
demanding the right of return to their homeland can be seen as a key event in Israel's 
Palestinian Arab Spring.38 Their actions were designed to highlight the plight of the refugees 
and expose the lack of legitimacy and authority of Arab regimes to decide their fate. This 
nonviolent protest, inspired by the Arab revolutions elsewhere, was enacted simultaneously 
in the West Bank, and on the borders of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Gaza with Israel. 
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34. Khaled Amayreh, “Hamas-Fatah Discord on Fayyad persists”, Al-Ahram 23-29 June 2011, p2.  
35. Personal interview with PLC member Bassam Salhi, 7 June, 2012, Ramallah. 
36. Ibid Shlaim, 2009 
37. www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/05/israel_and_palestine_0 (Accessed 16 
August 2011) 
38. Ibid 
Journal of  Conflict  
Transformation & Security 
Jordanian and Egyptian security forces prevented protesters from reaching the border with 
Israel.  
 
Israel responded violently against the protesters and it was reported that more than twenty 
demonstrators were killed in different locations.  Some argue that Assad exploited the Nakba 
Day to divert criticism and “manufacture” clashes on the border with Israel to deflect external 
attention on to Israel.39 Regardless of this, the failure of Israel’s use of military force to 
suppress nonviolent civil resistance demonstrates that even with sophisticated aircraft and 
missiles it is difficult to prevent or respond to such actions. Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defence 
Minister, warned that “We are just at the start of this matter and it could be that we’ll face 
far more complex challenges”.40 
 
Other examples of nonviolent direct action were organised by different civil society 
organisations. Local popular resistance groups protested against the construction of the 
Separation Wall and confiscation of Palestinian land. There was activism in the 
neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem against the confiscation of Palestinian homes. The Israeli 
organisation ‘Solidarity’ and Palestinian popular local committees in Jerusalem organised a 
march on 15 July 2011 to support the campaign for Palestinian UN membership.41 Meanwhile 
the local and international movement for boycott, divestment in and sanctions against Israeli 
and settlement goods has continued to grow.42 
 
The Arab revolutions highlighted the demands of millions of people in the Arab world for 
freedom and democracy, participation, social justice and an end to corruption and 
dictatorships. These calls may have given the Palestinian leadership cause for concern, given 
that the PNA has been frequently accused of the violation of human rights, mismanagement 
and corruption. There have been no election for the Palestinian Legislative Council in the 
occupied territories since 2006 and no election for the President. Historically the PNA in the 
West Bank and the Hamas administration in Gaza Strip have behaved much like other 
authoritarian regimes in Arab countries. Perhaps in recognition of the growing reluctance 
across the Middle East to countenance authoritarian and unaccountable styles of leadership, 
the Fatah Executive Committee recently took the unusual step of expelling one member on 
corruption charges. He now faces prosecution. During interview, an (anonymous) member of 
a Palestinian NGO explained to the author that “The PNA feels the heat of the events in the 
Arab countries and the calls to punish those accused of corruption”.43 
 
This pressure on the Palestinian leadership has also accelerated the call to replace the PLO 
old guard and give the younger generation a chance to play a role in shaping the future of the 
Palestinian society and polity. For some years a younger generation, who were born and have 
lived under Israeli occupation since 1967, have been demanding a greater role in political 
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Round Table: Palestinian Diaspora and Representation. (Accessed 13 January 2013) 
40. Jonathan Cook, On an old anniversary, a new sense that change is possible, the National, 17 May 
2011.  
41. Joel Beinin, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Arab Awakening, Middle East Research and Infor-
mation Project, August 1, 20011. www.merip.org/mero/mero080111.(Accessed 1 September 2011) 
42. Rashid Khalidi, "The Uncertain Arab Autumn", New Statement, 19 September 2011, p. 46.  
43. Personal interview conducted by the author, 12 March 2012, Jenin. 
participation. This call took another step with the campaign to mobilise and organise the 
Palestinian Shatat (Diaspora) to have representative bodies and mechanism for Palestinians 
and civic registration for direct election to the Palestinian National Council.44 The campaign 
demanding political change gathered speed during protests organised in the West Bank and 
Gaza demanding political reforms, new elections and reconciliation. These calls for reforms 
came from young independent people who reject the methods and politics of both Hamas 
and Fatah. Khouri noted that “The success of the uprisings in other Arab countries will only 
fuel the burgeoning Palestinian desire for freedom and justice.45 
 
The Palestinian Israeli conflict is widely seen as at the core of the conflict between Israel and 
the Arab countries. Palestinian resistance has long been a source of pride and admiration for 
neighbouring Arab people, who over the years they have made a great show of their support 
for their fellow Arabs in Palestine. Yet today it is the Palestinian people who look to 
revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen as a source of inspiration and a model for 
progressive change. Perceptions of Arab citizens have changed in Palestine, across the Arab 
region and worldwide. As former Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi states, “There is a 
new energy, a new dynamic”.46 The protests have unified the Arab public in their demands 
for "Alshab Yored isqat al-Nizam" meaning the "The people demand the fall of the regime" 
and inspired the revival of pan-Arab feelings.  
 
The Arab revolutions and Israel 
 
Israel is proud of its claim to be the sole democracy in the Middle East with a multi-party 
system, sharing the same values of liberal democracies in the West. The corruption and lack 
of democracy that has too often characterised Arab regimes in the Middle East has suited 
Israel’s interests and image, strengthening its claim to uniqueness in the region as a fully-
functioning liberal democracy surrounded by Arab dictatorships. By contrast to Israel, Arab 
leaders have been perceived as lacking in credibility and the support of their people. The 
moral legitimacy of Arab dictators to criticise Israel about its violation of human rights in the 
Palestinian occupied territories, or to make a credible demand for statehood for the 
Palestinians, has remained questionable for as long as they themselves were the main cause 
of political and social injustice in their own countries. Yet whilst Israel presented itself as 
above the autocratic fray, it also benefited from the ‘strong leadership’ that Arab regimes 
were able to provide. Klein has argued that “Israel has traditionally preferred to maintain 
close relations with non-democratic monarchs, rather than communicating with the people. 
Israel’s security, according to this view, is assured first by its own force, and second by strong 
Arab leaders who agree to cooperate secretly or openly with Israel.”47 It is perhaps precisely 
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National Council. http://palestiniansregister.org/?page_id=45 (Accessed 23 January 2013)  
45. Washington Report  on middle East Affairs, Ibid 
46. Associated Press, "Inspired by Arab Spring, Palestinians Protest is Bursting with New Energy" Haaretz, 
17 May, 2011. Http://www.haraetz.com/news/diplomacy/inspired-by-arab-spring-palestinian. 
(Accessed 14 June 2011)  
47. Menachem Klein, Is the Arab Spring Israel’s Winter, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol 18, no.1, 2012. 
WWW.pij.org/details.php?id=1404 
this kind of rationale that explains why in February 2011 the Israeli media confirmed that 
Netanyahu had offered Mubarak asylum.48 
 
Israel’s first response to the Arab revolutions was one of complete surprise and denial, 
portraying it as unauthentic and short-lived.  As time has passed the Israeli narrative has 
focused more on the danger to Israel, describing the Arab revolutions as “Islamist Winter” 
and highlighting the risk that the “Muslim Brothers” and other Muslim “extremists” groups 
would gain power and become a source of threat to Israel and in that way increase anxiety 
amongst the Israeli public.  Klein has explained that the Arab Spring has pushed Israel deeper 
into a ‘bunker mentality’ in the face of perceived existential threats”.49 Israel is concerned 
about any change to the status quo in the region, not least because for many years it has 
expended significant energy and resources to maintain its military superiority and political 
influence. Yet the status quo is indeed changing. According to Barghouti it “no longer 
applies”,50 whilst Byman argues that any changes in the region will impact on Israel “Even if it 
means the toppling of regional foes risks rocking this prosperous boat”.51 
 
In the global media Arabs are often perceived as undemocratic, fundamentalist, and 
accepting of oppression and hierarchical authority, which of course jars with the notion that 
they would be capable of calling for social justice, freedom and democracy.52 Udi Adiv, an 
Israeli academic, explained: “Israel wants to maintain its image as the only democracy in the 
Middle East" and as the “shining star” in the Arab darkness of the Middle East.53 Israel does 
not associate itself culturally, politically or economically with the wider Middle East, but 
rather it chooses to identify instead as part of the West where the Zionist movement was 
founded. Thus it came as no surprise when Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, initially 
described the Arab revolutions as an: ‘Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, 
undemocratic wave’, arguing that the Arab countries were ‘moving not forwards but 
backwards’.54 
 
By mid-2011 however the Israeli tone had changed. The Israeli public was becoming more 
aware that the Arab revolutions represented a historical change sweeping through the 
region. At the same time, the main concern of the Israelis military and the government 
turned towards assessing the impact of the Arab revolutions on the relationship with their 
peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. Israel has struggled to maintain its political partnership 
with the Egyptians in the face of growing insecurity. The gas pipeline that supplies Israel from 
Egypt has been sabotaged several times during 2011/12. In September 2011 the Israeli 
embassy in Cairo was overrun by thousands of demonstrators. The ambassador and his family 
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49. Ian Black, “Fretful Israel monitors the crumbling of the old certainties” The Guardian, London, 18 July 
2012, p 12. 
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2011, Vol, 30, issue 9,pp 63-63. 
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2011.  
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53. Personal interview, 15 June 2011, Israeli academic and activist, Haifa.  
54. Jonathan Cook, “Israel’s Grand Hypocrisy: Netanyahu Slams ‘Anti-liberal’ Arab Spring, Counterpunch, 
December 1 2011 
fled back to Israel.55 This came a matter of weeks after Israel attacked the Gaza Egypt border, 
killing three Egyptian police officers. In response to the incident Cairo had withdrawn its 
ambassador in Tel Aviv pending the outcome of an official investigation. Israel later 
apologised for the deaths of the officers.56 
 
The mass participation of ordinary citizens from all walks of life in the Arab revolutions has 
further discredited the notion that Western countries might be able to embed democracy to 
the Middle East through intervention and regime change of the type pursued in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Arab revolutions have demonstrated that change has to be home grown, 
owned and developed by the people in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other countries.57 The 
unarmed civil resistance in MENA countries may be bringing into question Israel’s focus on 
the centrality of hard power and the deployment of military force to achieve foreign policy 
objectives. It is possible that Israel is now aware that military might will not be able to 
respond to a determined popular nonviolent movement in the Palestinian occupied 
territories. As the Israeli defence Minister Barak told Haaretz newspaper “the Palestinians’ 
transition from terrorism and suicide bombings to deliberately unarmed mass 
demonstrations is transition that will present us with difficult challenges”.58 
 
The seismic political changes that are taking place in Arab countries have made Israel an even 
more important regional ally to the West, particularly the USA. Pratt and Salt argue the 
developments in Arab revolution countries have distracted the world’s media attention away 
from the Israel Palestine conflict. The political uncertainty has also made global leaders more 
reluctant to advocate against Israel’s continuing programme of building settlements and 
confiscating Palestinian land, and the new drive to introduce laws discriminating against the 
Palestinians citizens of Israel. This has had the net effect of introducing further barriers to 
resolving the conflict.59 
 
The wind of change in the MENA also inspired thousands of Israelis. It is estimated that more 
than 300,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Tel Aviv on 6 August 2011 and more in 
other cities, to press their demands for social justice and to protest over the lack of housing, 
expensive rents and the high cost of living that has hit mainly Israel’s poor but also the middle 
income bracket. Moshe Silman, an Israeli protester, set himself alight at a demonstration 
over the high cost of living. He died a week later.60 As Minister of Finance in 2003, Natanyahu 
led the policy of market economy that saw privatisation of the public sector and cut of 
subsidies for basic commodities.  When he returned to power as Prime Minster in 2009 he 
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continued with this drive to transfer services such as education, health, social welfare and 
others to the management of the private sector.61 
 
The campaign started with a handful of tents erected in the centre of Tel Aviv to highlight the 
social and economic injustices in Israel.  The movement rapidly mushroomed, extending to 
more than fifty Arab and Jewish localities in Israel and benefitting from wide public acclaim 
and enthusiastic support. This movement was exceptional in Israel , bringing political and 
social groups from the entire political spectrum; right and left, secular and religious, Jews and 
Arabs under one umbrella. It even included settlers from the occupied territories which 
caused intense controversy. Natanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, could not ignore this 
movement and immediately set up a committee to listen to the protesters and suggest 
recommendations. This same middle class that voted in Netanyahu was now demanding a 
review of the agenda of Israel’s national priorities and was critical of the ideological motives 
of government in spending on settlements in the occupied territories and the military cost of 
maintaining settlements, which has reached $1.5 billion annually.  The majority of the 
movement avoided discussing the link between the occupation, military spending and the 
question of how profits from the occupation have given rise to poverty and social exclusion. A 
minority in the protest movement, mainly from the Israeli left and Palestinians in Israel, 
argued that the cost of settlements and maintaining the occupation, and the military’s 
budget, and are the root causes for the poverty, lack of affordable housing and high cost of 
living.62 
 
These protests, along with earlier demonstrations organised by the Israeli left, highlighted the 
44 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and attracted the participation of 
more than 20,000 people, both Arabs and Jews.  An optimistic view from some activists in the 
Israeli peace movement argued that the events in the Arab countries gave them hope and 
increased support to the Palestinian struggle and that “Youth from Egypt sent messages of 
support to Palestinians and Israelis protesting against the Wall”.63 An Israeli peace activist 
summed up the impact of the Arab revolutions on Israeli society as follows: “I didn’t believe 
myself saying that we should learn from the Egyptian how to rise up, it was unbelievable to 
see signs written in Arabic Irhal (go) and under it in Hebrew (Egypt is here)”.64 
 
However, it is possible to argue that Israel has largely distanced itself from any link to the 
Arab revolutions next door.  This view is confirmed by the survey conducted by the Israel 
Democracy Institute in February 201265, where 91 percent supported the protest but only 13 
percent believed that it was influenced by the “Arab Spring”. 
  
Conclusion: 
 
The Arab revolutions or uprisings inspired both Palestinians and Israelis in various ways to 
take nonviolent direct action to address social and political issues. The dictators in Egypt and 
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Tunisia have gone but substantive transformation of the social and political structures which 
maintained the former regimes has yet to take place. This stage of transformation is a 
daunting challenge facing the democratically elected governments, tasked with creating new 
jobs and providing equal opportunities for accessing health, education and other services. 
 
At the regional level, a new order is emerging that challenges Israel’s dominance of the 
region.66 There is a democratically elected political leadership in Egypt from the Muslim 
Brotherhood with strong links to Hamas. Turkey has emerged as a critical player, benefiting 
from its mediation role and promotion of trade with the Arab world.  Turkey will be looking 
to strengthen its relations with the Arab countries and invest more politically and 
economically in this direction given the strained relationship with Israel since the incident of 
the Mavi Marmara. 
 
One can argue that the use of largely nonviolent peaceful protest for social and political 
change has undermined military doctrine and highlighted the human security aspects of the 
citizens of the region and inspired many people struggling for peace and justice, including 
Palestinians. The widespread demand for democratic changes and respect for human rights 
has delegitimized the Arab regimes and their dictatorships, and opened the door to a new era 
of self determination and change.   
 
Israel is facing new challenges. Rather than a military threat, these challenges arise because 
millions of Arabs are upholding their democratic rights. Israel “…has painted itself into the 
corner of only dealing with Arab potentates and thus it cannot tolerate such a gaze: for it 
cannot imagine itself existing in a democratic neighbourhood”.67 
 
The Arab revolutions across the MENA are bottom-up movements for change, not top-down 
change. They have been brought about by the mass participation of ordinary citizens from all 
walks of life and not the political elite, or the “old guard”.  This has challenged the West and 
the US views and attitudes that they can bring democracy to the Middle East through "regime 
change" and the maintenance of support to the dictatorships in MENA as long as possible . 
The invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan aimed to topple the regime and establish Western-style 
democracy in the region. The Arab revolutions countered this new neo-colonial ideology of 
imposing liberal type democracy and has shown that true change is home grown, owned and 
developed by the people.  
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